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Some Legislative History and Comments
on Ohio's New Criminal Code
Harry J. Lehman* and Alan E. Norris**
0 N JUNE 23, 1965, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES of the 106th
Ohio General Assembly adopted House Resolution No. 81, intro-
duced by State Representative Edmund G. James of Noble County,
then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. H.R. No. 81 re-
quested a comprehensive study of both criminal laws and procedures
by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission.
The Ohio Legislative Service Commission is the professional staff
of the Ohio General Assembly.1 It provides the full range of services
necessary in the legislative process to members of the General As-
sembly and its committees. The Commission itself consists of fourteen
members of the General Assembly, seven from the House of Repre-
sentatives and seven from the Senate.2 As part of its function to
"conduct research, make investigations, and secure information or
data on any subject and make reports thereon to the General As-
sembly,"3 the Legislative Service Commission may "appoint commit-
tees consisting of members of the General Assembly and such citizens
having special knowledge on a particular subject as the commission
may determine, to study and report on assigned subjects." 4
j in response to H.R. No. 81 and pursuant to this statutory author-
ity, the Legislative Service Commission appointed the Committee to
Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, a committee composed of
legislators, and a Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws
and Procedures, a committee composed of members of the bench and
* B.A., 1957, Amherst College; J.D., 1960, Harvard University; State Representative, 109th
Ohio General Assembly (56th House District, Cuyahoga County); Co-sponsor of House
Bill No. 511 to amend the Ohio Criminal Code.
* * B.A., 1957, Otterbein College; LL.B., 1960, New York University; State Representative,
109th Ohio General Assembly (59th House District, Franklin County); Sponsor of House
Bill No. 511 to amend the Ohio Criminal Code.
I OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §103.11 (Page 1969).
2Id.
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §103.13 (Page Supp. 1972).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §103.12 (Page 1969).
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bar from throughout the state, to conduct a survey of current prob-
lems in Ohio's criminal laws and procedures. This study committee
was assisted by the professional staff of the Commission. The results
of this initial study were published in Ohio Legislative Service Com-
mission Staff Research Report No. 82, Criminal Laws and Procedures:
An Interim Report in February, 1967. This report recommended that
a complete revision of Ohio statutory law covering crimes and pro-
cedures was in order. However, at the May, 1968 Primary Election,
the voters in Ohio approved what is generally referred to as the
Modern Courts Amendment. 5 Under Article IV, section 5 of the Ohio
Constitution, the responsibility of promulgating rules of practice and
procedure was vested in the Ohio Supreme Court.
Thereupon, the focus of the Technical Committee became sub-
stantive criminal law. During the next three years the Technical
Committee devoted its time to consideration of drafts of proposed
sections of a new criminal code, prepared by the staff of the Commis-
sion. In its deliberations and as a guide, the Technical Committee and
its staff relied on the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute,
as well as the revised criminal codes from Illinois, New York and
Wisconsin. 6
The final report of the Technical Committee consisted of a pro-
posed criminal code in bill form, together with comments to each pro-
posed new section, consisting of a review of existing statute and case
law and a discussion of the "operation and effect" of each proposed
section. The report was prepared by the Legislative Service Commis-
sion staff, approved by the Technical Committee and the Legislative
Service Commission, and published in March, 1971.1 The proposed
criminal code was introduced into the 109th General Assembly on
March 31, 1971, as H.B. 511, sponsored by State Representative Alan
Norris of Franklin County and eleven other representatives.
The proposed code repealed 440 statutes in the twelve existing
chapters of the Ohio Revised Code from 2901 through 2923, and
recommended 29 new chapters consisting of 157 new sections, plus
25 new sections and amendments to 49 existing sections in other parts
I The Modern Courts Amendment affected most of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. See
Milligan, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST.L.J.
811 (1968) for an excellent discussion of the background and impact of the amendment.
6 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE, viii (March,
1971).
7 The Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Proposed Ohio Criminal Code, was printed in
its entirety and made available to the public by Banks-Badlwin Law Publishing Company
and The W. H. Anderson Company. This was the only occasion during the 109th General
Assembly, and one of the few occasions during recent decades, that a bill under consider-
ation by the General Assembly was available in this form to the legal profession and
general public.
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of the Code. Altogether, H.B. 511, as introduced, proposed to repeal
536 existing sections, and replace them with 231 new or amended
statutory provisions.
House Bill 511 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee
on April 6, 1971. Over the next ten months, the Criminal Law Sec-
tion of the Judiciary Committee, under the Chairmanship of Repre-
sentative Alan Norris, received testimony and examined the proposed
code on a line-by-line basis.8 Amendments were made by both the
Criminal Law Section and the full Judiciary Committee, and a sub-
stitute bill was reported by the Judiciary Committee on March 14,
1972, with a recommendation for passage. Two full days of floor
debate followed, and on March 22, 1972, the substitute bill, with addi-
tional amendments, was passed by the House of Representatives. 9
Substitute H.B. 511 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on March 27, 1972, and extensive hearings were conducted in
a subcommittee chaired by State Senator Howard Cook of Toledo.
After further amendment, the Senate Judiciary Committee recom-
mended H.B. 511 for passage on November 29, 1972, and the bill was
acted upon and passed by the Senate, with a few additional amend-
ments, on December 6, 1972.10
When the House of Representatives refused to concur in Senate
amendments, as customary on bills of major import, a Committee of
Conference, consisting of three members of the House and three mem-
bers of the Senate, was appointed to reconcile the differences." The
8 Generally, testimony from members of the criminal bar, jurists, prosecutors, police officials,
court personnel and others involved in the criminal justice system on a day-to-day basis,
and other professionals and professional groups such as the state and local bar associations,
law school professors, private organizations and commentators, was surprisingly sparse
during consideration of H.B. 511 by the House Judiciary Committee. The Ohio Association
of Prosecuting Attorneys did a conscientious job of monitoring the hearings and made many
constructive recommendations. A member of the Adult Parole Authority also regularly at-
tended hearings and participated in discussions. The Ohio State Bar Association made a pre-
sentation during the final hours of consideration of a substitute bill by the full committee.
Some organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, made appearances
on selective provisions of the bill, such as capital punishment. Most of the time, however,
was spent in discussion of the sections of the proposed code, one by one, by members of
the committees, with considerable assistance by staff personnel of the Legislative Service
Commission and particularly Thomas R. Swisher, who had served as Project Officer to
the Technical Committee and as counsel to the Judiciary Committee. After Sub. H. B. 511
was received by the Senate Judiciary Committee in March of 1972, and it then appeared
that action on the bill would be taken during that session of the legislators, there was
greater response, comment, and criticism on various parts of the bill by persons who
had a vital interest in such legislation.
9 134 OHIo H. R. JOUR. 1782-1810 (1972). Twenty-one substantive amendments were
considered by the House of Representatives during floor debate.
10 134 OHIO SEN. JOUR. 1865-76 (1972). Nine substantive amendments were considered by
the Senate during floor debate.
11 Pursant to Rule 10 of the Joint Rules, the membership of the Conference Committee
consists of three State Representatives and three State Senators; a Conference Committee
Report, to be accepted, must be signed by two from each body. Serving on the Conference
Committee for the House of Representatives were Rep. Wiliam G. Batchelder of Medina,
(Continued on next page)
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Conference Committee's report was signed by all members and sub-
mitted to the House of Representatives and Senate and approved by
both on December 14, 1972. H.B. 511 was signed by the Governor on
December 22, 1972, and except for eight sections which became effec-
tive March 23, 1973, the provisions of the Act became effective Jan-
uary 1, 1974.
Having briefly outlined the history of the formal development of
the Act, it is the purpose of this Article to discuss in narrative form
the legislative process on certain key provisions which were the sub-
ject of much debate and disagreement.
Murder and Felony Penalties
As introduced, H.B. 511 retained the principle of indeterminate
sentences for felonies. Instead of retaining fixed minimum and max-
imum terms, however, the bill established a fixed maximum and
variable minimum for each degree of offense,12 as follows:
(Continued from preceding page)
Rep. Harry J. Lehman of Shaker Heights, and Rep. Alan E. Norris of Westerville; serving
for the Senate were Sen. Howard C. Cook of Toledo, Sen. Max H. Dennis of Wilmington,
and Sen. Jerry O'Shaughnessy of Columbus.
12 The following is an illustrative list of the newly enacted statutory crimes denominated as
felonies according to the degree of offenses:
Felony Ist: Kidnapping (without release of victim), §2905.01; rape, §2907.02; aggravated
arson, §2909.02; aggravated robbery, §2911.01; aggravated burglary, §2911.11; conspiracy
(where object is murder or aggravated murder), §2923.01; attempt to commit murder
or aggravated murder, §2923.02; engaging in organized crime, §2923.04; voluntary
manslaughter, §2903.03; involuntary manslaughter (relating to attempted felony);
§2903.04.
Felony 2nd: Kidnapping (with release of victim), §2905.01; child stealing, §2905.04;
robbery, §2911.02; burglary, §2911.12; carrying concealed weapon aboard aircraft,
§2923.12; felonious assault, §2903.11.
Felony 3rd: Involuntary manslaughter (regarding attempt to commit a misdemeanor),
§2903.04; aggravated vehicular manslaughter (with prior vehicular manslaughter charge);
§2903.06; abduction, §2905.02; extortion, §2905.11; sexual battery, §2907.03; corruption
of a minor (where offender is four or more years older than minor), §2907.04; gross
sexual imposition (on person less than 13), §2907.05; compelling prostitution, §2907.21;
promoting prostitution (with regard to person under 16), §2907.22; arson (causing harm
to statehouse), §2909.03; disrupting public services, §2909.04; safecracking, §2911.31;
corrupting sports (with previous theft or gambling offense), §2915.06; inciting to
violence, §2917.01; aggravated riot, §2917.02; bribery, §2921.02; intimidation, §2921.03;
perjury, 2921.11; tampering with evidence, §2921.12; carrying concealed weapon (with
previous conviction of any violent offense or if weapon is loaded), §2923.12.
Felony 4th: child stealing (by natural or adoptive parent), §2905.04; gross sexual imposi-
tion, §2907.05; promoting prostitution, §2907.22; disseminating obscene material to
juveniles, §2907.31; pandering obscenity (with previous offense), §2907.32; compelling
acceptance of objectionable materials, §2907.34; arson, §2909.03; vandalism, §2909.05;
breaking and entering, §2911.13; tampering with coin machines (with previous convic-
tion), §2911.32; grand theft, §2913.02; unauthorized use of vehicle (with previous con-
viction or removal of car from state), §2913.03; passing bad checks (with either previous
conviction or amount involving $150), §2913.11; misuse of credit cards (with either
$150 amount or previous conviction of theft), §2913.21; forgery, §2913.31; criminal
simulation, §2913.32; defrauding a livery or hostelry (with previous conviction of this
offense or theft), §2913.41; tampering with unrevoked will or governmental record,
§2913.42; securing writings by deception (with regard to amount above $150), 2913.43;
receiving stolen property (involving $150 amount or previous theft conviction), §2913.51;
gambling (with previous conviction), §2915.02; cheating (with previous theft or gambling
offense or amount involving $150), §2915.05; corrupting sports, §2915.06; aggravated
(Continued ou next page)
1974]
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss1/33
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Degree of Offense Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence
Capital Murder 13  Life Death
Murder 14  15 years Life
Felony - 1st15 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 years 25 years
Felony - 2nd 16  3, 4, 5 or 6 years 15 years
Felony - 3rd 17  2, 3, or 4 years 10 years
Felony - 4th18  1 or 2 years 5 years
This proposed schedule of penalties was approved by the House
of Representatives. In addition, proposed section 2929.05(D) pro-
vided that for purposes of sentencing, an offense could be reduced
one degree by the court, and the penalty specified for that lower degree
used in sentencing. 19 Guidelines were included in proposed section
2929.05(A)-(C) for imposing longer or shorter terms. 20 The idea of
the drafters was to give a degree of flexibility to trial judges in fitting
the punishment not only to the crime, but to the criminal. Thus, the
trial judge, when dealing with a first offender, could select a lower
minimum term than he would select for a repeat offender; and, if
mitigating factors were present, the court might reduce the sentence
even further by selecting one of the penalties provided for by the next
lower degree.
While the criteria set forth in proposed section 2929.05, which is
section 2929.12 of the Act, for imposing longer or shorter terms of
imprisonment were retained throughout the legislative process, the
(Continued from preceding page)
riot, §2917.02; inducing panic (where physical harm results), §2917.31; criminal abor-
tion, §2919.11; endangering children, §2919.22; obstructing justice (where crime aided
is a felony), §2921.32; escape, §2921.34; aiding escape or resistance, §2921.35; having an
unlawful interest in a public contract, §2921.42; having weapon while under disability,
§2923.13; unlawful transactions in weapons, §2923.20; aggravated assault, §2903.12;
aggravated vehicular manslaughter, §2903.06; negligent vehicular manslaughter (with
prior conviction), §2903.07.
13 Ohio House Bill No. 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly, §2929.01(A) (1971-1972)
[hereinafter cited as H.B. 5111.
14 H.B. 511 §2929.01 (B).
1SH.B. 511 §2929.04(B)(1).
16 H.B. 511 §2929.04(B) (2).
17H.B. 511 §2929.04(B) (3).
18H.B. 511 §2929.04(B) (4).
19 H.B. 511 §2929.05 (D). This proposed section provided:
Regardless of the penalty ordinarily provided, the court, in imposing sentence
for a felony of the first or lesser degree, may impose sentence upon an offender
according to the degree of offense next below that for which sentence is being
imposed, when the offender is not a repeat or dangerous offender, and the lesser
penalty appears in the interests of. justice and sufficient for the protection of the
public and the correction and rehabilitation of the offender. In such case, if the
offense for which sentence is being imposed is a felony of the fourth degree, the
court may impose the penalty ordinarily provided for a misdemeanor of the
first degree.
This specific subsection was deleted by the Senate, Am.Sub. H.B. No. 511, 109th Ohic
General Assembly (1971-1972).
20 Subsections (A), (B) and (C) of the House proposal provided:
(Continued on next page)
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terms of imprisonment varied substantially between the House and
Senate versions, and reconciliation was required by the Conference
Committee.
The Senate Judiciary Committee determined early in its deliber-
ation to lower the minimum penalties. Reacting to testimony that
some crimes were classified such that the minimum sentence exceeded
that under corresponding provisions in existing law,21 and mindful of
the penalty provisions in federal law, the Senate Subcommittee at one
point in its deliberations completely eliminated minimum penalties.
However, the final Senate Judiciary Committee structure for the felony
penalties, approved by Senate floor action, was:
(Continued from preceding page)
(A) In determining the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment to be
imposed for felony, and in determining whether to impose a fine for felony and
the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court shall consider the risk that
the offender will commit another crime and the need for protecting the public
therefrom, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, the character,
and condition of the offender, and the need for correctional or rehabilitative treat-
ment, and the ability and resources of the offender and the nature of the burden
that payment of a fine will impose on him.
(B) If the offender is a repeat or dangerous offender, it does not control the
court's discretion, but shall be considered in favor of imposing longer terms of im-
prisonment for felony.
(C) The following do not control the court's discretion, but shall be considered
in favor of imposing shorter terms of imprisonment for felony:
(1) The offense neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to
persons or property, or the offender did not contemplate that it would
do so;
(2) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
(3) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(4) There are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the of-
ense, though failing to establish a defense;
(5) The offender acted under strong provocation;
(6) The offender has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activ-
ity, or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial time before commission
of the present offense;
(7) The offender is likely to respond quickly to correctional or rehabili-
tative treatment.
Although subsection (D) was eventually discarded by the Senate (see supra note 19), sub-
section (A) and the concomitant criteria of subsections (B) and (C), as proposed by the
House, and subsequently proposed by the Senate, were substantially incorporated into the
new OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.12 (A), (B), and (C) (Page Supp. 1973). See note
29 infra, as to the changes in subsection (A) from the proposed to the final version.
21 A comparative examination of some of the House provisions to the corresponding pre- 197 4
Code sections will indicate the possible substance of the testimony. The following is a partial
list of the apparent minimum penalty disparities between the House proposal and the pre-
1974 law:
a) voluntary manslaughter: H.B. 511 §2903.03 (felony one, minimum 5 years);
prior code §2901.06 (minimum 1 year).
b) rape: H.B. 511 §2907.02 (felony one, minimum 5 years); prior code §2905.01
(minimum 3 years).
c) aggravated robbery: H.B. 511 §2911.01 (felony one, minimum 5 years); prior
code §2901.12 (minimum 1 year). But see prior §2901.13 relating to armed rob-
bery, which carried a minimum 10 year sentence:
d) aggravated arson: H.B. 511 §2909.02 (felony one, minimum 5 years); prior
code §2907.02 (minimum 2 years);
(Continued on next page)
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Degree of Offense Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence
Capital Murder 22  Life Death
Murder 23  15 years Life
Felony - 1st24  3, 4 or 5 years 25 years
Felony - 2nd25  2, 3 or 4 years 15 years
Felony - 3rd26  1, 11/2 or 2 years 10 years
Felony - 4th27  1 or 11/2 years, or def- 5 years
inite term of not
more than 6 months
in jail.
Because of the substantially reduced penalty schedule, the Senate
Judiciary Committee determined that it was not necessary to retain
the House provision permitting the trial judge to reduce the offense
one degree for purposes of sentencing, and, accordingly, deleted pro-
posed section 2929.05 (D).28
In the give and take of Conference Committee deliberations, the
final schedule of felony penalties which was adopted represented a
middle position between the House and Senate versions, and included
(Continued from preceding page)
e) felonious assault: H.B. 511 §2903.11 (felony, second degree, minimum 3
years); prior code §2901.241, assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon, carried
minimum imprisonment of 1 year.
f) robbery: H.B. 511 §2911.02 (felony two, minimum 3 years); prior code
§2901.12 (minimum I year).
g) extortion: H.B. 511 §2905.11 (felony three, minimum 2 years); prior code
§2907.01 (minimum 1 year). But see prior code §§2901.27 and 2901.32 relating
respectively to abducting for purpose of extortion and threatening to abduct for
extortion, the former imposing a minimum sentence of 20 years or life, the latter
imposing a 5 year minimum.
h) sexual battery: H.B. 511 §2907.03 (felony three, minimum 2 years); prior
code §2901.24, assault with intent to commit rape or to kill (minimum 1 year).
i) compelling prostitution: H.B. 511 §2907.11 (felony three, minimum 2 years);
prior code §2905.17 (minimum I year); the prior procuring statute, §2905.18,
however, carried a minimum 3 year sentence.
j) perjury: H.B. 511 §2921.11 (felony three, minimum 2 years); prior code
§2917.25 (minimum 1 year).
k) bribery: H.B. 511 §2921.02 (felony three, minimum 2 years); prior code
§§2917.01 and 2917.06 (1 year and 60 days respectively), the latter provision
relating to bribery of a witness.
1) aiding escape: H.B. 511 §2921.35 (felony four, minimum 1 year); prior code
§2917.12 (maximum 90 days).
CAVEAT: Section 2929.05 (D) of the House proposal, which provided that an offense could
be reduced one degree by the court for purposes of sentencing, would have further reduced
the extent to which these proposed new minimum penalties would have exceeded the old.
2rAm.Sub. H.B. No. 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly, §2929.02(A) (1971-1972) [here-
inafter cited as Am. Sub. H.B. 511); now termed "aggravated murder" by §2929.02(A)
OHIO REV. CODE (Page Supp. 1973).
2 Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §2929.02(B).
2 4 Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §2929.11(B) (1).
2s Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §2929.11(B) (2).
26 Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §2929.11(B) (3).
2 7Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §2929.11 (B) (4).
2 See supra notes 19 and 20.
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recognition of the minimum sentence House provision permitting the
lowering of the offense one degree for sentencing.2 9 The Conference
Committee reported the following:
Degree of Offense Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence
Aggravated MurderO Life Death
Murder 31  15 years Life
Felony - 1st 32  4, 5, 6 or 7 years 25 years
Felony - 2nd33  2, 3, 4 or 5 years 15 years
Felony - 3rd-4  1, 11/2, 2 or 3 years 10 years
Felony - 4th35  1/2, 1 11/2 or 2 years 5 years
Capital Punishment
Capital punishment for murder and other crimes has been an
issue of great public interest and debate and, therefore, one with
political overtones. As introduced, H.B. 511 retained the death penalty,
but limited its imposition to only three species of murder, whereas
current law provides the death penalty for nine separate offenses.
The three classes contained in proposed section 2903.01 were pre-
meditated murder, intentional killing using an illegally concealed fire-
arm or other dangerous weapon, and felony murder. In addition, the
proposed section also provided that imprisonment was to be an al-
29 With regard to the lessening of the minimum sentence, the Senate proposal, §2929.05 (C),
Am.Sub. H.B. No. 511, had read:
"The following do not control the court's discretion, but shall be considered in favor of im-
posing shorter terms of imprisonment for felony..." (emphasis added). The enacted legis-
lative counterpart, as previously altered and recommended by the Committee of Conference,
now reads:
"The following do not control the court's discretion, but shall be considered in favor of im-
posing a shorter minimum term of imprisonment for felony. (emphasis added). OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §2929.12(C) (Page Supp. 1973).
This language substantially effectuates the legislative intent of discarded House pro-
posal §2929.05 (G) discussed supra note 19.
There is a further noticeable distinction between the House and Senate versions of felony
determination, on the one hand, and that of the Conference Committee's report. Both the
House and Senate provisions, §2929.05 (A), provided criteria with respect to the court's
"determining the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment to be imposed .... "
In contrast, the Conference Committee's recommendation, 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2428
(1972), and the newly enacted Code provision, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.12 (Page
Supp. 1973), have related the criteria to the court's "determining the minimum term of
imprisonment ....
30 134 OHIO H.R. JouR. 2428 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.02 (A) (Page Supp.
1973). See supra note 22.
3' 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2428 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.02(B) (Page Supp.
1973).
32134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2428 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.11(B) (1) (Page
Supp. 1973).
3134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2428 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.11(B) (2) (Page
Supp. 1973).
34134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2428 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.11(B) (3) (Page
Supp. 1973).
35 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2428 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.11(B) (4) (Page
Supp. 1973).
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ternative to death in every case, while pre-1974 law provided that there
was no alternative to the death penalty upon conviction for assassina-
tion of the president6 or the governor. 37
In. addition, the bill attempted to introduce into Ohio law the
concept of "bifurcated" proceedings, that of having separate hear-
ings, one on the question of guilt and one on the question of the
penalty. The procedure, if adopted, would have been confined to capital
offenses only, although some other jurisdictions employ it for all
offenses.3
The bill also provided guidelines for use by a jury or panel of
judges in determining whether a convicted murderer should live or
die.39 These guidelines were based on standards found in the Amer-
ican Law Institute's Model Penal Code. 0 Under pre-1974 Ohio law,
juries were simply instructed that whether or not they recommended
mercy was a weighty matter to which they should give their most
careful consideration. 41
In recommending that there be a separate proceeding for deter-
mining the penalty in a capital case following the verdict or plea of
guilty, the Technical Committee relied upon several considerations:
[T]he present system for imposing the death penalty pre-
sents substantial difficulties, growing out of the fact that the
question of guilt and the question of the penalty are con-
sidered by the jury at the same time. First, the procedure
places the defense in the position of having to plead for the
accused's life at the same time he is trying to convince the
jury that he is not guilty in the first instance. The two
arguments are not always compatible, and in a given case a
plea for mercy can subtly incline the jury toward rendering
a verdict of guilty. Further, when all the jurors are finally
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2901.09 (Page 1954).
37 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2901.10 (Page 1954).
3 E.g., Texas employs a bifurcated jury proceeding for all crimes. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.07 (1966); see also the provisions in other states which employ bifurcated
proceedings for capital crimes only: CAL. PEN. CODE §§190, 190.1 (West Supp. 1970);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §53a-46 (West 1972); N.Y. PEN. LAWS §125.30 (McKinney
Supp. 1973) and §125.35 (McKinney 1967).
39 H.B. 511 §2929.03.
40 A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE §210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
41 E.g., use of the following jury instruction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 160 n. 4, 249 N.E.2d 897, 907 n. 4 (1969):
If you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you must determine
whether or not you will extend mercy. This matter is solely within your discretion
(emphasis added), and it requires the exercise of your most profound judgment.
You must not be motivated by sympathy or prejudice, or as a means of escaping a
disagreeable duty. The issue of mercy must be resolved in the light of all the facts
and circumstances (emphasis added) of the case with respect to the crime and the
circumstances surrounding this defendant as disclosed by the evidence.
[Vol. 23:8
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convinced of the accused's guilt, they might, in the atmos-
phere of the moment, feel themselves so revolted by the
crime that they refuse to recommend mercy when they might
recommend mercy if given time to reflect. Accordingly, [the
proposed section] provides a procedure whereby the guilt or
innocence of the accused is separately determined, and if a
guilty verdict is returned, a second hearing is held solely on
the question of the penalty which ought to be imposed. The
technical committee feels that this will permit the jury to
consider the question more dispassionately, and armed with
better information than they can get under the present sys-
tem, i.e., testimony and evidence bearing on the question can
be elicited which one side or the other would not have the
temerity to use during the trial proper. Finally, the death
penalty can be imposed only if the jury or panel of judges
unanimously, and affirmatively, vote for it. In the absence
of a vote for the death penalty, or with only one vote dis-
senting against the death penalty, life imprisonment is man-
datory. This, in effect, is an about-face from the present
procedure, under which the death penalty is mandatory in
the absence of an affirmative recommendation of mercy.42
Public testimony before the House Judiciary Committee revealed
little public support from either prosecution or defense oriented wit-
nesses for the "bifurcated" procedure. Accordingly, since a majority
of that committee opposed that approach, the bill was amended to
eliminate the separate hearing. The committee did, however, retain
the suggested criteria to be used by the jury or panel of judges in
determining whether to impose death or imprisonment for capital
offenses,4 and upon motion of State Representative Joseph Tulley of
Mentor, kidnapping for ransom was reinserted as a capital offense. 4
The House Judiciary Committee, by a vote of eight to seven, rejected
an amendment by State Representative Harry Lehman of Shaker
Heights, to eliminate capital punishment.
During the first day of floor debate on Sub. H.B. 511, there were
four amendments on capital punishment offered and debated. An
effort by Representative Lehman to reverse the Judiciary Committee
classification of kidnapping for ransom as a capital offense and to
treat it in the same manner as other kidnapping offenses, was de-
feated by voice vote.45 The next amendment to eliminate capital punish-
4 2 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE 282 (1971).
4 Sub. H.B. 511, 109th Ohio General Assembly, §2929.03 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as
Sub. H.B. 5111.
44Sub. H.B. 511 §2 905.01(c).
45 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 1788 (1971-1972). The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, did
adopt this amendment, and all kidnapping offenses were treated as a first degree felony. Am.
Sub. H.B. 511 §2905.01(c).
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ment in Ohio, also offered by Representative Lehman, would have
substituted life imprisonment for capital punishment, and required
a minimum of thirty-five years of imprisonment under proposed sec-
tion 2967.13(B) before parole consideration.46 State Representative
Donald Maddux submitted an amendment to this amendment to re-
quire that anyone convicted of murder "shall be imprisoned for the
remainder of his natural life." Both amendments were defeated by a
voice vote, by use of a standard parliamentary technique of tabling
the motions to amend.47
The final attempt to amend Ohio's archaic laws on capital punish-
ment was an amendment to proposed section 2929.01 offered by Rep-
resentative Marcus Roberto of Ravenna. This amendment would have
changed the burden of judgment in the jury proceedings to provide
that there was a presumption of mercy and life imprisonment unless
"the jury or panel of judges trying the accused recommends that no
mercy be shown him, in which case he shall suffer death."4 8 This
amendment was defeated by a vote of thirty-eight for, fifty-seven
against.49
After Sub. H.B. 511 passed the House, and while pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Supreme Court of the United
States, on June 29, 1972, decided Furman v. Georgia,0 the effect of
which was that the death sentences of most if not all prisoners cur-
rently housed in this country's prisons, including Ohio's, were in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Soon thereafter, on July 19, 1972, as anticipated, the Ohio Su-
preme Court responded in State v. Leigh,"1 a case involving a de-
fendant convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In
referring to the Furman case, the Court held that:
Under that holding, which we are required to follow, the
infliction of any death penalty under the existing law of Ohio
is now unconstitutional (with the possible exception of the
taking of a life or attempting to take the life of the Presi-
6134 OHiO H.R. JouR. 1791 (1971-1972).
47 During the two day debate on Sub. H.B. 511 it was the practice of Speaker Charles Kurfess
to act on amendments by voice vote, unless the sponsor of the amendment insisted on a roll
call vote and was supported by five members in accordance with Rules of the House of Rep-
resentatives. Rule 48, Rules of the House of Representatives, 134 OHIo H.R. JOUR. 59
(1971-1972).
I134 OHIO H.R. JOUR, 1792 (1971-1972).
491d. at 1792-93.
50408 U.S. 238 (1972).
51 31 Ohio St.2d 97, 285 N.E.2d 333 (1972).
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dent * * * (R.C. 2901.09) or of the Governor * * * (R.C.
2901.10) which statutes purport to impose a mandatory
penalty of death.52
The Ohio Supreme Court's hesitation in ascribing unconstitu-
tionality to Ohio's only mandatory death statutes appeared to be
justified in light of the evident focus of the majority opinions in the
Furman case, for it was the life-versus-death sentencing discretion
permitted by statutes to juries in most capital cases that was the
focus of attention in the opinions of the five justices supporting the
majority decision. The five justices constituting the majority in the
Furman case appeared to agree that this discretion was being exer-
cised in an arbitrary or prejudicial manner.5 3
Further, a review of the opinions of Justices Stewart, White,
and Douglas, who wrote that only existing capital punishment prac-
tices were unconstitutional, suggested the possibility of two basic
approaches to the problem of discrimination. One such solution would
be elimination of the sentencing discretion, or imposing strict limta-
tons on this discretion by legislative enactment. The second solution
would be legislative narrowing of the range of criminal acts punish-
able by death to those acts likely to produce a death sentence from a
jury retaining unlimited sentencing discretion.m
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in the midst of its consideration
of Sub. H.B. 511, could not await the analyses, standards, and guid-
ance that would come from law review and bar association articles
and comments that follow major decisions of the Supreme Court. 5
At this point, working from models prepared by the staff of the Leg-
islative Service Commission, there appeared to be four basic choices
under the Furman case available to the Committee:
(1) Abolish the death penalty.
(2) Retain the death penalty, but make its imposition
mandatory in specified cases.
521d. at 99, 285 N.E.2d at 334-35.
s3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The opinions are replete with statistical evidence
on these points. Concurring Justice Douglas, Furman, supra, at 250 n. 15 cites to H. BEDAU,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (1964) for the proposition that something more than
chance accounts for racial differences in infliction of the death penalty. Concurring Justice
Brennan, Furman, supra at 292-93, is equally concerned with the arbitrary execution among
those arbitrarily sentenced.
s4 Even these suggested solutions entail a perplexing discretionary problem: "jury nullification"
(failure of a jury to convict where it does not wish the death sentence to be imposed); see
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 246-47 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
55 E.g., Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP.CT.REv. 1;
Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty: The Strategy Behind Furman, 82 YALEL.J.
1111 (1973); Five-to-Four Vote Kills Capital Punishment Almost, 58 A.B.A.J. 972 (1972);
Note, Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Death Penalty as Currently Administered
Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 47 TUL.L.REV. 1167 (1973).
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(3) Retain the death penalty and permit the jury or
judge to decide if it is to be imposed in a given case, but pro-
vide criteria to guide the jury or judge in making the deci-
sion. This had been, in essence, the approach of the House
of Representatives.5 6
(4) Refine the House position by retaining the death
penalty, but remove from the judge and jury as much discre-
tion as possible in the punishment determination procedure.
Mindful of the action taken by the House of Representatives in
retaining capital punishment and sensing a similar attitude by the
members of the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee opted for the
last described alternative. In amending the House version, the com-
mittee provided what may be described as a three-step procedure.
First, it determined that only premeditated murder and felony murder
would be capital offenses. Second, it directed that the death penalty
be imposed if any of nine listed "aggravating circumstances" was
specified in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Third, it created a set of three "mitigating factors" which, if estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence, would result in a sentence
of life imprisonment. The proposal provided that the presence or
absence of aggravation would be determined by the jury or panel of
judges during the trial, and the presence or absence of mitigating
factors would be determined by a three-judge panel following the
verdict of guilty of both the principal charge and specification of an
aggravating circumstance.
The nine aggravating circumstances delineated by the Senate
Judiciary Committee were:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the President
of the United States or Governor of the State, or person in
line of succession to either, or of a member of Congress or
of the Chief Justice, or judge of a court of record of this
state or of the United States, or of a candidate for any of the
foregoing offices.
(2) The offense was committed with purpose to facil-
itate an activity of a criminal syndicate, as defined elsewhere
in the proposed Code.
(3) The offense was committed for hire or for personal
gain or aggrandizement.
(4) The offense was committed for the purpose of escap-
ing detection, apprehension, trial or punishment of another
offense.
-' Sub. H.B. 511 §2929.03.
[Vol. 23:8
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
OHIO'S NEW CRIMINAL CODE
(5) The offense was committed while the offender was
a prisoner in a detention facility.
(6) The offender had previously been convicted of an
offense of which the gist was the purposeful killing or an
attempt to kill another committed prior to the offense at bar,
or the offense at bar was a part of a course of conduct in-
volving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or
more persons by the offender.
(7) The offender killed the victim from ambush.
(8) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement of-
ficer whom the defendant knew to be such, and either the
victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the offense,
or it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforce-
ment officer.
(9) The victim was substantially defenseless at the time
of the offense by reason of being completely in the offender's
power or by reason of youthful immaturity, the infirmities
of age, or physical and mental impairment resulting from de-
fect, disease or injury.57
The three "mitigating factors" adopted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee were:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been com-
mitted, but for the fact that the offender was under duress,
collusion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the of-
fender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condi-
tion is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
58
Senate debate did not probe or modify the new capital punishment
determination procedure. An amendment offered by State Senator
Harry Meshel of Youngstown to delete the "Governor" and insert the
"Vice President of the United States" in the first number of the ag-
gravating circumstances was defeated by voice vote.5' An amendment
by State Senator Oliver Ocasek of Akron to eliminate capital punish-
ment and substitute life imprisonment "with or without hope of
parole," to be determined by a set of standards set forth in the amend-
ment, was defeated by a vote of six for, twenty-two against.60
57Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §§2901.95 (A) & 2929.04(A).
-8Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §§2901.95 (B) & 2929.04(B).
59 134 OHIO SEN. JOUR. 1875 (1971-1972).
601d. at 1871-73.
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The rules of procedure of the legislature required that all of the
Senate amendments to Sub. H.B. 511, including those pertaining to
capital punishment, be presented to the House of Representatives as
a package and be accepted or rejected in their entirety.61 As is the
custom on major substantive legislation, the House of Representatives
refused to concur in the Senate amendments, so as the rules further
provide, the bill was submitted to a Committee on Conference. 2 The
effect of the application of the rules was that the House of Represen-
tatives, acting through the committee system, floor debate, and amend-
ment process, did not have the opportunity to objectively scrutinize
the capital punishment system designed by the Senate. This respon-
sibility rested with the three House members appointed by the Speaker
to serve on the Conference Committee. In this instance the House con-
ferees could not act in the traditional role as "defenders" of the House
"position" on this issue, as this position had been abrogated by the
Furman case.
The six-member Conference Committee devoted several hours
to discussion of the capital punishment sections, and several sub-
stantial modifications were contained in the Conference Committee
Report. First, the Conference Committee decided to eliminate the
procedure requiring the appointment of a three-panel judge to try
the issue of mitigation, substituting the trial judge in its place. 63 The
theory that brought about this result was recognition of the fact that
the two additional judges would not have the benefit of the evidence
given at the trial, and the hearing on the issue of mitigation could
result in a retrial of the case in its entirety.
Second, the Conference Committee eliminated altogether the
second and ninth aggravating circumstances described above, and
substantially altered several others." Application of the first aggra-
vating circumstance was reduced to the assassination of the President,
Vice President, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or a person who has
been elected to or is a candidate for any such office.' 5 The third aggra-
vating circumstance was limited to offenses committed for hire.66
In addition, the seventh aggravating circumstance calling for the
offender to have killed the victim from ambush was eliminated, and
there was substituted in its place the following language:
61 Rule 9, Joint Rules of 108th General Assembly.
62 134 OHIO H.R. JoUR. 2372 (1971-1972); 134 OHIO SEN. JOUR. 1885 (1971-1972).
63 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 2427 (1971-1972).
64d at 2427-28.
65 d. at 2427.
66Id.
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The offense was committed while the offender was com-
mitting, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggra-
vated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.67
In essence, this last change, urged on the Conference Committee by
the Ohio Prosecutors Association, adopts the felony murder rule, with
the result that the death penalty will be imposed in all cases of felony
murder, unless one of the three mitigating circumstances is found to
be present.
Finally, the Conference Committee recommended that the effec-
tive date for reinstituting capital punishment in Ohio be deferred
until January 1, 1974, the date when the principal provisions of the
new criminal code were to be effective.6 Having acted on a most
difficult issue in a novel manner and in relative haste, dictated by
the circumstances of the legislative process, the conferees believed
that there should be a period of time not only for retrospection of
their decisions, but to examine legislative enactments in other states
confronted with the same issue.
Parole Eligibility: Life Imprisonment for Capital Offense
Under pre-1974 law, an offender serving a life sentence for a
capital offense was not eligible for parole.69 However, he was entitled
to a commutation hearing after serving twenty years (twenty-five
years in some cases) at which hearing the Adult Parole Authority
was required to determine whether or not his sentence should be com-
muted and to make the appropriate recommendations to the Governor.
If the Governor commuted the sentence, an offender immediately be-
came eligible for parole consideration. If the Governor failed to com-
mute the offender's sentence, he was entitled to further commutation
hearings at five-year intervals.
As introduced, section 2967.13 of H.B. 511 provided that a pris-
oner serving life imprisonment for a capital offense would become
eligible for parole after serving a minimum term of twenty years,
diminished by time off for good behavior, thus eliminating the com-
mutation procedure. As a result, "lifers" would have become eligible
for parole after having served twelve years, nine months and fifteen
days in the penitentiary.
The House Judiciary Committee did not react affirmatively to
the provision providing for time off for good behavior, and amended
the bill to provide for initial parole eligibility after having served
67 Id. at 2428.
68 Id. at 2429; section 4 of the Act (Am.Sub. H.B. 511, as enacted and signed by the Governor).
69OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2967.13 (Page Supp. 1972) as enacted in Am.Sub. H.B. No. 28,
130 LAWS OF OHIO, Pt. 2, 154 (1964) [repealed by Am.Sub. H.B. 511 (1974)).
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twenty full years.7 0 The Committee did, however, reject an amend-
ment that would have retained the former commutation proceedings
in lieu of parole considerations.
Section 2967.13 was the subject of considerable debate on the
floor of the House of Representatives, and was successfully amended
by State Representative Richard Christianson of Mansfield by a vote
of fifty-nine for, thirty against, to raise the initial term of parole
eligibility from twenty years to thirty-five full years.7 1 While few
House members were willing to defend this amendment in private
discussion, the prevailing attitude appeared to be that they were un-
willing to vote against such a "get tough" amendment on a recorded
vote.
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in response to strong
opposition testimony from prison and parole authorities, made it clear
early in their deliberations that there was little support for the thirty-
five year provision. After considerable debate, the committee opted
for the standard of section 2967.13 as introduced, thus permitting
parole for those serving life imprisonment for a capital offense after
twenty years, with time off for good behavior. That provision was sup-
ported by the full Senate.
Because of the wide disparity between the versions of section
2967.13 as passed on the House and Senate floors, this section was the
obvious subject for compromise in the Conference Committee. The
recommendation of the Conference Committee, ultimately accepted
by both Houses, was to provide for parole eligibility after serving
fifteen full years.7 2
Early Release on Parole ("Shock Parole")
Early in its deliberations, the House Judiciary Committee
amended the parole sections of H.B. 511 to provide that notwith-
standing other provisions for parole eligibility, an offender serving a
felony sentence may be paroled after serving six months, provided his
offense was not murder or capital murder, it was his first felony con-
viction, he was not a repeat or dangerous offender, he did not need
further institutionalization, and his history, character, and condition
indicated he was likely to respond affirmatively to early release and
was unlikely to commit another crime.73 In providing a procedure for
granting "shock parole," this amendment complemented the then
existing statute on "shock probation," which was not changed by
H.B. 511.
70 Sub. H.B. 511 §2967.13(B).
71134 OHIo H.R. JOUR. 1797 (1971-1972).
nOHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2967.13 (Page Supp. 1973).
73 Sub. H.B. 511§2967.26.
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Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee determined to
broaden shock parole, and accordingly set aside the House provision
which limited shock parole to first offenders, providing instead that
a prisoner would be eligible if he had not been previously convicted
of a felony for which he was confined for thirty days or more in a
penal or reformatory institution. 4 The Conference Committee retained
this latter version.
Probation
Under pre-1974 law, the determination of eligibility for proba-
tion was generally based upon the consideration of the type of offense
committed. The Ohio Revised Code provided that there were certain
non-probationable offenses and that those who were convicted of those
offenses were not eligible for probation, regardless of the circum-
stances surrounding the offense, and regardless of the history, char-
acter and condition of the offender.7" As introduced, H.B. 511 sought
to shift the emphasis from non-probationable offenses to non-proba-
tionable off enders.76 Accordingly, except for aggravated murder and
murder, all offenses were considered probationable, but "repeat" and
"dangerous" offenders, as defined in the code,77 were not eligible for
probation. Further, in pursuance of the objective and in an effort to
achieve more uniformity in the use of probation, new section 2951.02
(B) details ten criteria to be "considered in favor of placing the of-
fender on probation."
The basic shift in philosophy was carried intact throughout the
legislative consideration of H.B. 511, except in one area. During the
time the new criminal code was under consideration, the General As-
sembly on May 17, 1972 enacted H.B. 143, providing that any person
convicted of a violation of any of twenty-nine listed felonies who had
a firearm in his possession during the commission of those felonies,
would receive an additional sentence and not have the benefit of
probation.
Accordingly, in the final version of Am. Sub. H.B. 511, it was
deemed necessary to incorporate the provisions of H.B. 143 as another
exception to the general rule that all offenses are probationable. As
a result, section 2951.02 (F) (3) of the new criminal code reads as
follows:
14 Am.Sub. H.B. 511 §2967.31.
75 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2951.04 (Page 1954). This section was originally enacted as
§13452.2, OHIO GENERAL CODE by Am. S.B. No. 8, 113 LAWS OF OHIO 123, 201 (1929)
[repealed by Am.Sub. H.B. 511 (1974)]. These non-probationable offenses are murder,
arson, burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, incest, sodomy, rape without consent, assault
with intent to rape, and administering poison.
76 H.B. 511 §2951.02 (A).
77 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.01 (Page Supp. 1973).
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(F) An offender shall not be placed on probation when
any of the following applies: . . . (3) The offense was com-
mitted while the offender was armed with a firearm or dan-
gerous ordnance as defined in Section 2923.11 of the Revised
Code.
Reasonable Doubt
In its final form, Am. Sub. H.B. 511, in defining "reasonable
doubt" combines elements of the former Ohio and existing federal
definitions, with changes in style that should assist juries in under-
standing the term.
The pre-1974 section 2945.04 of the Ohio Revised Code defined
"reasonable doubt," and required that the statutory definition be
read to the jury as part of the court's charge in criminal cases. As
introduced, H.B. 511 defined "reasonable doubt" in language almost
identical to former section 2945.04, Ohio Revised Code.
However, the initial version of the bill discarded the require-
ment that the statutory definition be read to the jury, since in the
Technical Committee's view, a failure to instruct the jury on the mean-
ing of reasonable doubt would result in reversible error.78 In addition,
the committee did not wish to discourage trial courts from explaining
the meaning of reasonable doubt with as much detail as seemed neces-
sary in a given case, believing that the reading requirement tended
to promote rigidity in instructing the jury on this point.
As introduced, the definition of "reasonable doubt" reads:
'Reasonable doubt' is that state of the case which, after
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in such condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty
of the truth of the charge. Reasonable doubt is not mere pos-
sible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or
depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt."
This definition, as well as the elimination of the requirement that
it be read to a jury, remained intact as the bill came to the floor of
the House. On the second day of debate, State Representative Arthur
Wilkowski of Toledo was successful in amending the definition. 0 Rep-
resentative Wilkowski's stated reasons for his amendment was his
belief that the federal court definition of "reasonable doubt" was
clearer than that used by the state, and that accordingly he wished to
78 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE 29 (1971).
-H.B. 511 §2901.05(c).
80 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 1806 (1971-1972).
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introduce into Ohio law some aspects of the federal definition.1 The
amendment was approved by a vote of forty-two for, thirty-four
against, and it changed the definition appreciably:
'Reasonable doubt' is that state of the case which, after
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in such condition that they can-
not say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty
of the truth of the charge. It is a doubt based upon reason
and common sense, the kind of a doubt that would make a
reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt must be proof of such convincing character that an
ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it un-
hesitatingly in the most important of his own affairs. 2
The House floor amendment generated considerable debate and
public testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. As a result,
the Senate Judiciary Committee attempted to formulate a definition
that would adopt the best parts of the former Ohio and existing federal
definitions, and to rework language to make it more comprehensible
to lay jurors. The committee also reinserted into the bill the require-
ment that the definition be read to jurors as part of the charge in a
criminal case. 3 The Senate Judiciary Committee's work was approved
by the full Senate and the Conference Committee, and provides as
follows:
'Reasonable doubt' is present when the jurors, after they
have carefully considered and compared all the evidence, can-
not say they are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge.
It is a doubt based upon reason and common sense. Reason-
able doubt is not mere possible doubt, because everything re-
lating to human affairs or depending on moral evidence is
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 'Proof beyond a
81 E.g., a detailed instruction which the D.C. Circuit has termed an "exemplary charge" reads
as follows:
Now reasonable doubt, as the name implies, is a doubt based on reason, a doubt
for which you can give a reason. It is such a doubt as would cause a juror, after
careful and candid and impartial consideration of all the evidence to be so un-
decided that he cannot say that he has an abiding conviction of the defendant's
guilt. It is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable person to hesitate or pause
in the graver or more important transactions of life. However, it is not a fanciful
doubt nor a whimsical doubt, nor a doubt based on conjecture. It is a doubt which,
as I say, is based on reason. The government is not required to establish guilt be-
yond all doubt, or to a mathematical certainty or a scientific certainty. Its burden
is to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moor v. United States, 345 F.2d 97, 98 n. 1. (D.C. Cit. 1965). Note the close
similarity between this instruction and that adopted by the Ohio Legislature.
8 2134 O8Io H.R. JOUR. 1806 (1971-1972).
83 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2901.05(B) (Page Supp. 1973).
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reasonable doubt' is proof of such character that an ordinary
person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most
important of his own affairs.8
Affirmative Defenses
As introduced, H.B. 511 included definitions of a number of
affirmative defenses, in many cases enlarging existing common law
definitions. Those statutorily defined defenses were: coercion, 5 entrap-
ment, 6 ignorance or mistake of fact or law, 7 intoxication," insanity, 9
justifiable use of deadly force90 and justifiable use of force. 91 While
several of these definitions were materially restructured by the House
Judiciary Committee, all seven remained in the proposed Code as
passed by the House of Representatives.
Then, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, witnesses represent-
ing both prosecution and defense interests, complained at length about
the wording of the definitions, for different reasons. Members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee accepted their argument that affirmative
defenses would best be left to developing case law, and deleted all
definitions from the bill. The Senate Committee action was accepted
by the Conference Committee.
Sex Offenses
Sex offenses, like capital punishment, compose an area of human
behavior attracting considerable public interest, and, therefore, re-
ceived detailed attention by legislators, who offered many amendments
to this part of the proposed Criminal Code.
Chapter 2907, as recommended by the Technical Committee, rep-
resented a substantial restructuring of the criminal law in this area.
For example, the offense of rape, which included the traditional con-
cept of intercourse with a female by force, was expanded to include
offenses committed by a female on a male or by persons of the same
sex, offenses in which the offender deliberately impairs the victim's
judgment through the use of drugs or intoxicants, and offenses when
the victim is under thirteen years of age. 92 State Representative Donna
Pope offered a floor amendment to the penalty section for rape, im-
posing life imprisonment on any offender who "purposely compels" a
4OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2901.05 (D) (Page Supp. 1973).
5 H.B. 511 §2901.32.
6 H.B. 511 §2901.33.
87H.B. 511 §2901.34.
-H.B. 511 §2901.35.
9 H.B. 511 §2901.36.
0 H.B. 511 §2901.37.
91 H.B. 511 §2901.38.
92 H.B. 511 §2907.02.
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victim less than thirteen years of age "to submit by force or threat
of force. '93 This amendment was adopted by a vote of seventy-six for,
eight against.9 4
After approving general definitions of "sexual conduct," "sexual
contact," and "sexual activity," the legislature accepted new offenses
for which there was no analogous section under existing law, includ-
ing gross sexual imposition,95 sexual imposition,9 6 and importuning
or solicitation.9 7 A floor amendment to proposed section 2907.07 by
Representative Pope extended the offense of importuning to prohibit
solicitation of "a person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity
with the offender when the offender knows such solicitation is of-
fensive to the other person, or is reckless in that regard."8 On a
recorded vote, it was approved by a vote of seventy-three for, thirteen
against."
The General Assembly also enacted a "peeping Tom" prohibition,
accepting the Technical Committee's recommendation that voyeurism
be a misdemeanor of the third degree. 100
The House Judiciary Committee accepted proposed section
2907.05, which made sexual contact with another not the spouse of
the offender under certain defined conditions a felony offense, but
tempered its impact and the possibility for abuse by adopting an
amendment that "no person shall be convicted of a violation of this
section solely upon the victim's testimony unsupported by other
evidence." 107
Bestiality and necrophilia, copulation with an animal or dead
human body, respectively, had been criminal offenses under former
law, 02 but not included in H.B. 511, as introduced. State Representa-
tive Joseph Tulley of Mentor successfully amended proposed section
2907.03 of the H.B. 511 in Judiciary Committee to restore this con-
duct as criminal under the offense of sexual battery, a felony of the
9134 OHIo H.R. JouR. 1789 (1971-1972).
94 id.
95 H.B. 511 §2907.05.
96 H.B. 511 §2907.06.
9Sub. H.B. 511 §2907.07.
" 134 OHIO H.R. JoUR. 1795-96 (1971-1972).
99Id. at 1796.
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2907.08 (Page Supp. 1973).
101 Sub. H.B. 511 §2907.05(B).
102 The probition against bestiality remained in effect until January 1, 1974. OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. §2905.44 (Page 1954), originally enacted as §13043, OHIO GEN. CODE by S.B. No.
508, 82 LAWS OF OHIO 241 (1885) [repealed by -Am.Sub. H.B. 511 (1974)].
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third degree.03 Representative Harry Lehman, in a floor amendment
adopted by voice vote, removed this language from section 2907.03
and placed this offense in a new section, 2907.10, reducing the penalty
to a first degree misdemeanor. 1 4 Although the Senate did not modify
this section, this proposed offense was reconsidered by the Conference
Committee and deleted from the bill altogether.05
Representative Tulley offered several other amendments in the
Judiciary Committee and during floor debate to restore to the bill
offenses which were recognized under former laws. His amendment
to make fornication (cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex
not the spouse of the offender) a misdemeanor of the third degree
failed both in the Judiciary Committee and on the floor, the latter by
a voice vote.10 6 Another amendment offered by Representative Tulley
would have created separate offenses prohibiting any person from
engaging in "fellatio or cunnilingus with another" or having "anal
intercourse. '"107 This amendment was rejected both by the committee
and during floor debate, again by voice vote.10 Representative Tulley's
amendment to make homosexual acts a criminal offense under the
new code was also defeated in the Judiciary Committee, and was not
offered during floor debate.
Conclusion
The authors question whether there are any dramatic conclusions
that may be drawn from this work. We note that the starting point
of the legislative consideration of House Bill 511 was substantially
different from most bills dropped into the legislative hopper. H.B.
511, in its original form, was the result of five years of effort by leg-
islators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and academicians,
supported by qualified professional staff. The bill was precisely drafted
and properly organized, accompanied by case analysis and explana-
tion of substantive changes proposed by the Technical Committee.
Over an 18-month period a small group of State Representatives and
State Senators, many serving and becoming deeply involved by reason
of committee assignment, devoted hundreds of hours to reviewing,
understanding, probing, debating, and amending this comprehensive
103 Sub. H.B. 511 §2907.03 (B).
104 134 OHIO H.R. JoUR. 1789 (1971-1972).
15 1d. at 2425.
106M. at 1797.
'
07 Id. at 1795. It was the view of the Technical Committee that anal intercourse, cunninilingus,
and fellatio "carry a high risk of psychic or physical harm to the victim, and should, in de-
fining sex offenses, be considered in the same category as vaginal intercourse." OHIO LEGIS-
LATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE, p. 100. Accordingly, these
acts are included in the definition of "sexual conduct." Newly enacted OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §2907.01 (A) (Page Supp. 1973).
108 134 OHIO H.R. JOUR. 1795 (1971-1972).
[Vol. 23:8
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
OHIO'S NEW CRIMINAL CODE
measure. Professional staff support was consistent and strong through-
out, which is not always the case in consideration of proposed legisla-
tion at the state level.
Although there were several issues on which the members of the
Judiciary Committees were deeply divided, the divisions were on a
philosophical, historical, or legal basis, and never on a political basis.
No votes, either in committee or on the floor, were along party lines,
and neither the Republicans or Democrats caucused to make "policy"
on any issue or vote on the bill.
Public interest and response, as we have indicated, and that of
legislators generally, was modest and focused on major policy deci-
sions, such as the retention or elimination of capital punishment and
sex offenses. A state income tax, financing of educational programs,
environment protection, strip mine regulation, and election law re-
forms were among those issues which had higher legislative priorities
and greater public attention during the lengthy sessions of the 109th
General Assembly in 1971 and 1972. Comprehensive revisions of the
Ohio Criminal Code were made and accepted "in stride," in part be-
cause it was generally acknowledged that recodification was long
overdue. The substantive modifications of law incorporated in H.B.
511 were consistent with reforms adopted in other states and, while
innovative in some respects, were neither radical in content nor par-
ticularly liberal in attitude. Further, it may be said that the policies
underlying the decisions which eliminated some activities from, and
added others to, the schedule of human behavior which is now char-
acterized as criminal were consistent with the attitudes of most
Ohioans in the 1970's. Finally, the work of the Judiciary Committees
was undertaken and performed in a professional and harmonious
manner.
We recognize that in the years ahead, the Ohio General Assembly
will undertake consideration of amendments to the new criminal code,
but we believe that these will focus on technical corrections that may
be required, and amendments dictated by a legislative response to
court decisions interpreting the language of the new criminal code.
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